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CLIO'S FANCY: DOCUMENTS TO PIQUE THE IDSTORICAL IMAGINATION 
Society, Matter, and Human Nature: Robert Gelston Armstrong and Marxist Anthropology 
at the University of Chicago, 1950 
Robert Gelston Armstrong (1917-87) entered the doctoral program of the University of 
Chicago anthropology department in the fall of 1939, and at the same time joined the Communist 
Party. After completing his masters thesis on the basis of fieldwork in Oklahoma, he was drafted 
into the U.S. Army, in which he served for three years, first as a code clerk in Panama and the 
United States, and then in the invasion of Germany during the last months of the war. In the 
spring of 1946, he reswned graduate study, but after a year accepted an appointment at Atlanta 
University, where he taught during the academic year 1947-48. During the following academic 
year he taught at the University of Puerto Rico, where he also did fieldwork in the nearby town of 
Caguas as part of Julian Steward's team, although without producing a chapter for The People of 
Puerto Rico. Upon his return to Chicago in the fall of 1948, he spent several months writing a 
manuscript entitled "Society and Matter," which he regarded as essential methodological and 
epistemological preparation for a library dissertation on state formation in Africa. 
Wtitten during the early phases of the McCarthy era, "Society and Matter" is remarkable 
as an explicit attempt to ground anthropological research in general, and Armstrong's doctoral 
dissertation in particular, in a systematically Marxist point of view. It is at the same time 
intellectually idiosyncratic, wide-rangingly eclectic, informally conversational, and, in the end, 
unfinished, both stylistically and substantively. But regarded as an instance of a very small 
category (Marxist anthropological analysis in the United States during the early Cold War 
period), it is perhaps of some historical interest, as a stimulus to more historical systematic 
consideration of that category. 
The first twenty-five pages of "Society and Matter" are a "Prologue,'' in which 
Armstrong, reverting to his military experience as a cryptanalyst, shows how the jwnbled of 
letters of the first two lines of a coded message intercepted from a "from a well-known 
anthropologist" could be translated into English-as an analogical demonstration of the problem 
of fmding "patterns" in anthropology. This is followed by a twenty-eight page "Preface" putting 
forward the "hypotheses" that that the "universe and everything iin it consists of matter and is one 
material system, whose parts are organically interrelated"; that "motion is the manner of existence 
of matter"; and that "the basic manner of motion and therefore the basic category of the universe 
is contradiction." There are then three substantive chapters: "Direction, Trajectory and Networks 
of Trajectories"; "Material Things"; and "Criteria of Organization and Integration" before the 
manuscript breaks off at page 107. The table of contents, however, lists also two chapters as 
"proposed": one on "Patterns" (including the heading "Culture as a system of patterns 
conditioned by the human mind"); another on "Society" (as a "material thing" and a "biological 
thing," differing "profoundly :fi:om all the previous levels" and "synthesiz[ing] them all." 
The completed portions reflect an unusually wide range of reading: philosophers, ranging 
from Heraclitus, Zeno, and Aristotle through Aquinas, Kant, and Hegel, down to Bertrand 
Russell, John Dewey, and Sidney Hook; political theorists, including Machiavelli, Gumplowicz, 
Oppenheimer, and Maciver; psychologists, including Freud, the gestalt psychologists and a recent 
compilation of seven contemporary psychologies; natural scientists from Newton to Einstein to 
Norbert Weiner; and of course Marxists, from Marx and Engels through Plekhanov and Lenin to 
a recent Soviet Textbook of Marxist Philosophy edited by M. Shirokov-as well a nmnber of 
anthropological writers including Redfield, Whorf, and, strikingly, the German ethnologist 
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Wilhelm Miihlmann. The style is conversational, with extended quotations from numerous 
interlocutors, some of them in Armstrong's own translations from the French, German, Italian 
and Rvssian originals. The most important of these was the Scottish polymath Lancelot Law 
Whyte, who .had maintained in conversation with Armstrong that "the attempt to characterize a 
society as a material thing had been "rendered obsolete by the discovery of the equivalence of 
matter and energy" (cf. Whyte 1948:68-69). To the contrary, Annstrong hoped to demonstrate 
that "dialectical materialism" was not only a viable but a necessary standpoint for the 
understanding of a society. To this end, he inserted into his manuscript, as pages 32a-d, a 
supplementary statement on "Human Nature," which he listed in the table of contents as "An 
outline discussion of human nature as an analogic scenario of this whole thesis." Since the 
inserted material refers to two of the corollaries to Annstrong' s first hypothesis, I have included 
these as preface to the text reproduced below: 
Corollary (Ib): Quite a number of the observable regularities among biologicaL social 
and cultural systems are due to the fact of their common materiality and must be explained in 
terms of the nature of the functioning of material systems as such. 
Corollary (Ic ): The description and explanation of phenomena on the biological, 
human-social and cultural levels requires that they be first isolated or distinguished 
conceptually from the purely material phenomena with which they are inseparably connected. 
To do this we must first identity and subtract by analysis that which is merely material in 
these phenomena. 
[here, Annstrong noted the insertion of pages 32a, 32b, 32c and 32d, as follows:] 
These corollaries were suggested by a consideration of the problem of a holistic-
aesthetic approach to the problem of human nature and to the study of social forms and to the 
study of social forms and types generally. Despite the fmm which this thesis is taking, I 
fully agree with Redfield and others that the method of explicit statement of hypothesis and 
problem before undertaking an investigation has severe limitations. The emphasis on 
hypothesis made a great deal of sense a reaction to the old idea that one should approach field 
work without preconceptions of any kind and "allow the facts to speak for themselves." It 
was found that investigators as a matter of fact always do have preconceptions, and that it is 
much better to get them out in the open by specifying than to allow them to remain as 
submerged menaces to navigation. Then too, as Miihlmann says, "the facts speak for 
themselves if we know what questions to ask." 
Nevertheless, I have never felt and do not feel now that the testing of previously 
stated hypotheses is an adequate field or research method. Most of the problems that one can 
state in advance of research soon look very nai've as the work proceeds. John Dewey has 
argued that a major reason why the frame of reference of scientific research methods cannot 
be prescribed in advance by an institution or by any other source is that adjustment of the 
frame of reference constitutes at least half of the on-going research problem itself I have 
certainly found it so in all my own work. Explicitly stated problems and hypotheses should 
never impose limits on observation. They are coiTectly used as heuristic guides and as 
warnings of the investigator's biases. We must, for example, never allow any amount of 
subtle methodological and theoretical disquisition to argue us out of the obvious fact that 
people learn to understand and deal with each other all the time. It may be difficult to 
establish a concept of human nature rigorously enough to satisfy all the theorists. But 
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millions of people have a concept of it that is adequate for many, many purposes. The 
elaboration of an even more satisfactory concept, that will be adequate for some of the new 
problems the modem world faces, must take this datum of experience into account. Perhaps the 
attraction which dialectical materialism as a body of thought has for me is that it alone 
among intellectual disciplines known to me allows one to deal both analytically and synthetically 
with the phenomena of nature in general and of society in particular. 
I believe, therefore, very firmly in the importance of the "naive," aesthetic eye for wholes 
among the phenomena we study. Nevertheless, it seems to me that when we deal in this way with 
problems such as the nature of the state or the nature of a human being, we run the danger, as 
expressed in Corollary Ib, that many of the more obvious characteristics of our phenomenon are 
not distinctive. Corollary Ic is intended as a partial statement of a method for dealing with this 
problem. 
I submit herewith an outline for the conception and study of human nature that I prepared 
while attending Redfield's seminar on human nature. In a sense, this material is a digression; and 
much of the terminology will only be explained later on in this thesis. It should serve, however, 
to illustrate what I mean by Corollaries Ib and Ic; and it serves analogically as a "scenario" for 
this thesis generally: I mean to deal in similar fashion with the problems of kingdoms in Africa. 
HUMAN NATURE 
I. What do we mean by understanding the 'nature' of any class of phenomena: oysters, 
electromagnetic radiation, sulphur, etc.? My answer: understanding the contradictions 
that constitute it. 
II. What assumptions must we make on the basis of which to start our study? 
A. A human being is a material object and has in common with other material objects 
the qualities of self-motion, motion-in-contradiction, and interpenetrative implication 
with the other material phenomena of the universe. 
B. A human being is a living, organic object and therefore: 
1. is a vortex through which quite a variety of material things must pass (such as 
food, ideas, visual impressions, etc.), and through which some things must be 
kept from passing; 
2. has a communication-and-control system, distinguishable, if not separable, from 
the organic whole. 
C. A human being (matter plus soma plus psyche) ts a highly-if not perfectly 
integrated whole. 
1. Therefore, any given part "contains" the other parts and the whole process by 
implication. (The specific pattern of form and function of a particular prut gives us 
information about the rest of the person). 
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2. Therefore, a human being can be studied as other systems are studied: by the 
construction of hypotheses to explain--or integrate--observed behavioral data, and 
then by searching to see if other new facts cominue to fit the hypotheses. 
a. introspection and projection are special cases of this: one observes that 
many qualities are in common between one's ow-n behavior and that of other 
people. One assumes therefore that many other less obvious 'internal' 
processes are likewise in common. One's own introspective activity, 
therefore, becomes a source of hypotheses for testing generally. Likewise, 
one's first test of a new hypothesis from whatever source is usually an 
internal, introspective [one] ("Am I like that?" "Does this fit me?''). People 
often defend hypotheses which obviously do not correspond to their own 
actual behaviour and attitudes. They can be brought to realize this if too many 
sub-conscious emotional blocks not interfere. 
ill. Human nature may be conceived thetically, antithetically, and synthetically. 
A. the thetic conception of human nature should begin with the identification of the 
characteristics which distinguish man from the rest of the universe of phenomena. 
1. He is a two -legged primate with the unique foot that permits him to march in 
step, play football and basketball, dance the classical ballet, high jump, skip 
rope, etc. 
a. his erect posture has resulted and is resulting in specific alterations in every 
bone in the body, the musculature, functions of the internal organs such as 
the diaphragm, etc. 
2. He has a unique hand, archaic in general pattern, exceedingly flexible in its 
particular form. The similar hands of the other primates are overspecialized for 
arboreal brachiation. 
a. the human hand has immense flexibility for too-using, knot-tying, piano-
playing, etc. 
b. it is a sexual instrument of great importance. 
3. He has a unique ability to cry and to laugh and to produce a umque 
psychological capacity for identification and projection. 
4. He has a unique pattern of sexual activity, being much less bound to rutting 
periods, etc. than other animals. Several positions of intercourse are uniquely 
human, including that of full-length face-to-face body contact. (No other animal 
can do it anatomically, although the other apes come close). 
5. He has a unique vocal and oral apparatus, which permits speech, song-recitals 
and the Navaho Night Chant 
6. He has a unique brain, which permits and creates culture and co-ordinates all the 
rest. 
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B. The antithetic conception of human nature begins with the study of the societies in 
which people (like many other biological organisms) live, as being the most human 
part of the enviromnent-the generalized antithesis (see page 82 below). (Societies 
as natural phenomena can also be studied on their own level as theses, etc. Here we 
are asking a more specific question: What is the reaction of hwnan societies towards 
the individuals in them?). I propose the following propositions for testing: 
1. The adults who make up the leading parts of society at large fmd infants, 
children, and young people sexually attractive, they respond to the by direct 
sexual arouse and by visual -aesthetic-emotional identification. They are thereby 
willing and able to abide the obstreperous and difficult younger generation long 
enough to teach it what it must know. As people mature they exchange sexual 
attractiveness for greater mastery of social and cultural techniques. 
2. A major category of relationship of the individual to society is by the interplay 
and pattern-matching of verbal-mental images in conversation. Humans fmd the 
sinuous interplay of these patterns in itself stimulating and satisfying, entirely 
apart from the. actual content of what is said. Given the contrast principle 
discussed on pages 100-101 below, the more intimate, specific and complex the 
fit, the more aesthetically satisfying. 
C. Human nature may be conceived of synthetically as an exceedingly complex 
integration of the general and the particular-human. 
1. As a material thing, the human being must be studied in his essential self-motion. 
He cam1ot be reduced conceptually to an assemblage of molecules or to external 
social relationships. 
a. The most mechanical of his "physical displacements in space" have a deep 
and intimate stamp of the human about them. This is even more true of the 
quality ofhis physical interactions with the things in his enviromnent. 
2. As an organic vortex, he is once again human in the particulars of his vortex 
pattern. 
3. In addition to a material and biological aspect bearing a human stanlp, he has a 
very large syndrome of uniquely human processes (see III above), which 
however, bear a physical and biological stamp. 
a. As human food, health, heredity, habits, ideas, culture and society change, 
human nature must also be said to change. Insofar as man effects these changes, 
he "makes himself" The more or less conscious way in which he goes about this 
is probably the most uniquely human feature of his self-motion. 
Lest it be assumed that "Society and Matter" is throughout presented in this propositional mode, 
it may help to give a brief excerpt of its more discmsive substance, which draws on a variety of 
Armstrong's intellectual and life experiences, including in several instances, his ethnographic 
research in Caguas. The most extensive and most interesting of the latter is a passage offered in 
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his discussion of Corollary IIIb: '"The characteristic relation of opposites to each other is the dual, 
contradictory one of unity and conflict": 
I found it difficult to arrive at a fruitful definition of the socio-cultural 
phenomenon called the town of Caguas, Puerto Rico, in an informal study I made in 1948. 
One could very easily see the entire town by climbing one of the nearby mountains. It had 
very well-marked edges; and I always found the thought rather startling that 25,000 people 
lived on or in that postage-stamp (as it looked from a.'ly distance). Its architecture and town 
plan was typically Spanish, and there was complete unanimity of informants and 
documentary sources that the name of trjs collection of houses and streets abound a plaza 
was "Caguas." Yet these facts got one exactly as far towards a definition that would be 
usef'.ll for the solution of problems in the social science as would be in the information that a 
featherless biped dressed in a uniform is called "soldier." The town is the communications 
center for the east-central part of the island. This has been true throughout its history. Today 
it is the meeting place of five major highways and a narrow-gauge railway. I found that a 
large majority of the inhabitants of Caguas make their living outside of it (a list of all the jobs 
being held in the town accounted for only about a third of the working force). Even 
businesses whose physical plant was in the tov.'11 had their decisive economic connections 
outside: many or most of their customers were outside; the decisive businesses were Eastern 
Sugar Associates (owned in Baltimore, Maryland) the branch of the Banco Popular of San 
Juan, the Chase National Bank, agencies for Westinghouse, General Electric, Ford, General 
Motors, Chrysler, Norge Refrigerator and various insular government offices and institutions. 
The mayor was also the agent for General Electric. There was a large group of cane-cutters 
who lived in the slums of the tmw and who worked in the fields nearby. There was a 
diamond cutting factory which imported its raw materials and exported its product. Thee was 
a very large group of persons who lived in the town but commuted to work in the San Juan 
area and otl1er areas. So it would seem that the people who made their living mainly in the 
town itself were a relatively unimportant group that was mairJy perfonning services for 
those whose main connections were outside. And yet Caguas was known all over the island 
as a town with strong local feeling and pride. In the 1948 election Caguas was the only town 
to produce a notewmthy revolt against the Popular Party, and although the Populares carried 
the town by a small margin, ma.'ly many Cagtieftos voted for it \vit.lt a heavy hea.>t and soul.,. 
searching. 
What then does this socio-cultural phenomenon consist of? From one point of view it is a 
nexus or vortex of contradictory or "opposite" relationships each of which is characterized by 
the fact that at least one of its terms is in some physical sense located i..'l the town of Caguas. 
The streets, houses, etc., are from this point of view little more than a fossil which gives 
testimony to the nature of a socio-cultural phenomenon whose weight lies elsewhere. The 
town's internal definition might be seen to lie in the fact of the conflict between common 
residence and external interest of its citizens. And i..'l point of fact, in this respect Caguas is 
not different from any other city, since no city that ever was could possibly survived apart 
from the multifarious contacts and relationships with the world outside it which are precisely 
its raison d' etre. 
Now all this is very well. This conception of a city seems to me fruitful and good in that 
it suggests and leads to a host of particular new lines of investigation and gives us a live 
framework for ordering the facts which we collect. Nevertheless, I am still far from satisfied 
with the concepts of "opposites" and "contradiction" in this situation. In what sense is the 
dia.'Uond-cutting factory opposite to its source of supply or to its market? In the last citation 
from Shirokov we have a hint in that the phrase "new type of internal conflict" is use rather 
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incidentally as a synonym for "new contradiction." Now a business relationship mutually 
satisfactory to both parties and lasting for a long period is a conflict in the sense that it is part 
of the general struggle of the market, and in the sense that there is a certain jockeying for 
position around every transaction. But in another sense it rather hurts to hear relationships 
which I have defined as long-term and satisfactmy called "conflicts." I see no reasons, 
however, to exempt "conflict," "contradiction," or "opposites" from the general "yes is no 
and no is yes" pattern of dialectical definition. Once again we see the Chinese-box character 
of reality. The exploration of this problem seems to me important, but so large a job as to lie 
beyond the scope of this paper" (Armstrong 1950: 52-54) 
There was, in fact, a great deal that to Armstrong seemed important, but remained beyond the 
scope of his unfinished manuscript However, while he did refer to it in his doctoral dissertation, 
in which the concepts of "contradiction" and "exploitation" played a central role, he never 
attempted to complete "Society and Matter,", nor to address some of the unresolved issues (one 
might even say "contradictions") contained in it. He later spoke of having taken the time to write 
it as a justification of his right, in the face of criticism, to adhere to the doctrine of dialectical 
materialism; later on, of having spent "a lot of energy on the application of the theory of 
dialectical materialism to anthropology and in the end found I was talking only to myself' (in 
Stocking n.d.) 
It may be assumed, however, that members of the Chicago faculty were aware of the 
project, since the surviving copy is contained in Armstrong's student file. And although the 
typescript bears no reader's markings, and is not referred to in his student record, it is clear that 
Robert Redfield k..1ew of Armstrong's Marxist interests (although not of his Communist Party 
membership), since these were explicitly manifest in the doctoral dissertation that Armstrong 
completed in the fall of 1950. Redfield read it "from begimnng to end" and in a general way 
approved it, although he was troubled by the idea of "exploitation," not so much because of its 
"background in Marxism," but because "the concept is not so clearly defined as it sounds" (in 
Stocking n.d.) 
Despite that reservation, Redfield continued to think highly of Armstrong, and when 
Annstrong was looking for an academic job in the summer of 1953, after returning from two 
years of fieldwork among the Idoma of Nigeria, Redfield offered him a temporary position as his 
replacement during Redfield's leave of absence in Europe. The fall of 1953, however, was the 
apogee ofMcCarthyism in American academic life, and Armstrong's appointment was forestalled 
by the intervention ofthe Federal Bureau oflnvestigation several weeks before the opening of the 
fall quarter (an episode which, along with Armstrong's subsequent internal academic exile and 
later career as expatriate anthropologist in Nigeria, will be treated in detail in Stocking n.d.) 
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RESEARCH IN PROGRESS 
Alice Conklin (University of Rochester) held a Guggenheim Fellowship during 2000-01 
for a study of ethnographic liberalism in France, 1920-1945. 
Jonathon Glassman (Northwestern University) held a Guggenheim Fellowship during 
2000-01 for a study of racial thought in colonial Zanzibar. 
'Rob Hancock (Department of History, University of Victoria; rola@uvic.ca) is 
completing a Master's thesis entitled, "The Potential for a Canadian Anthropology: Diamond 
Jenness's Arctic Ethnography." 
Dustin Wax (New School for Social Research) has begun work on a dissertation 
examining the "Fox Project" of Sol Tax in tetms of the institutional and theoretical histmy of 
post-WWII anthropology and the relationship between Indians and anthropologists. 
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